



### MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

- Propose a general method for analyzing the risk bound in the presence of adversaries. Our method is general in several respects. First, the adversary we consider is general and encompasses all  $l_q$  bounded adversaries. Second, our method can be applied to multi-class problems and commonly used loss functions such as the hinge loss and ramp loss.
- Prove a new bound for the local worst-case risk under a weak version of Lipschitz condition.
- Derive the adversarial risk bounds for SVMs and deep neural networks. Our bounds have two data-dependent terms, suggesting that minimizing the sum of the two terms can help achieve adversarial robustness.

#### **ADVERSARIAL LEARNING**

The adversarial learning problem can be described as follows.

- The learner receives n training examples denoted by  $S = ((x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \cdots, (x_n, y_n))$  drawn i.i.d. from P and tries to select a hypothesis  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  that has a small expected risk.
- However, in the presence of adversaries, there will be imperceptible perturbations to the input of examples, which are called adversarial examples.
- We assume that the adversarial examples are generated by adversarially choosing an example from neighborhood  $N(x) = \{x' : x' - x \in \mathcal{B}\}$  where  $\mathcal{B}$  is a nonempty set. The radius of the adversary is defined as  $\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} := \sup_{x \in \mathcal{B}} d_{\mathcal{X}}(x, 0)$

To measure the learner's performance in the presence of adversaries, we define the adversarial expected risk of a hypothesis  $h \in \mathcal{H}$  as

$$R_P(h, \mathcal{B}) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim P}[\max_{x' \in N(x)} l(h(x'), y)].$$

If  $\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} = 0$ , then the adversarial expected risk will reduce to the standard expected risk without an adversary.

Since the true distribution is usually unknown, we instead consider adversarial empirical risk.

$$R_{P_n}(h, \mathcal{B}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ \max_{x' \in N(x_i)} l(h(x'), y_i) \right].$$

#### MINIMAX LEARNING

• Wasserstein distance between two probability measures  $P, Q \in \mathcal{P}_p(\mathcal{Z})$  is defined as

$$W_p(P,Q) := \inf_{M \in \Gamma(P,Q)} (\mathbb{E}_{(z,z') \sim M}[d_{\mathcal{Z}}^p(z,z')])^{1/p},$$

where  $\Gamma(P,Q)$  denotes the collection of all measures on  $\mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{Z}$  with marginals P and Q on the first and second factors, respectively.

• The local worst-case risk of h at P,

$$R_{\epsilon,p}(P,h) := \sup_{Q \in B^W_{\epsilon,p}(P)} R_Q(h),$$

where  $B_{\epsilon,p}^W(P) := \{Q \in \mathcal{P}_p(Z) : W_p(P,Q)\} \le \epsilon\}$  is the *p*-Wasserstein ball of radius  $\epsilon \ge 0$ centered at P.

# Theoretical Analysis of Adversarial Learning: A Minimax Approach

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### MAIN RESULTS

#### Motivation

- The adversarial expected risk over a distribution P is equivalent to the standard expected risk under a new distribution P'.
- We can show that all these new distributions locate within a Wasserstein ball centered at P.
- By considering the worst case within this Wasserstein ball, the original adversarial learning problem can be reduced to a minimax problem, and we can use the minimax approach to derive the adversarial risk bound.

#### **Proposed method**

• Define a mapping  $T_h: \mathcal{Z} \to \mathcal{Z}$ 

$$z = (x, y) \to (x^*, y)$$

where  $x^* = \arg \max_{x' \in N(x)} l(h(x'), y)$ .

• Let  $P' = T_h \# P$ , the pushforward of P by  $T_h$ , we have

$$W_p(P, P') \le \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}.$$

• Therefore, the relationship between local worst-case risk and adversarial expected risk is as follows.

$$R_P(h, \mathcal{B}) \le R_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}, 1}(P, h),$$

#### Local worst-case risk bound

- Assume that for any function  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  and any  $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ , there exists  $\lambda_{f,z}$  such that  $f(z') - f(z) \le \lambda_{f,z} d_{\mathcal{Z}}(z, z')$  for any  $z' \in \mathcal{Z}$ .
- Let  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^+ := \inf\{\lambda : \psi_{f,P_n}(\lambda) = 0\}$  where  $\psi_{f,P_n}(\lambda) := \mathbb{E}_{P_n}(\sup_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}}\{f(z') \lambda d_{\mathcal{Z}}(z,z') f(z)\}).$
- Strong duality result for local worst-case risk by Gao & Kleywegt [2]. For any upper semicontinuous function  $f : \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{R}$  and for any  $P \in \mathcal{P}_p(\mathbb{Z})$ ,

$$R_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}},1}(P,f) = \min_{\lambda \ge 0} \{\lambda \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} + \mathbb{E}\}$$

where 
$$\varphi_{\lambda,f}(z) := \sup_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \{ f(z') - \lambda \cdot d_{\mathcal{Z}}(z, z') \}.$$

Lemma 1. Fix some  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ . Define  $\overline{\lambda}$  via

Then

$$\bar{\lambda} := \arg\min_{\lambda \ge 0} \{\lambda \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} + \mathbb{E}_{P_n}[\varphi_{\lambda,f}(Z)]\}.$$

$$\bar{\lambda} \in \begin{cases} \left[0, \frac{M}{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}}\right] & \text{if } \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} \geq \frac{M}{\lambda_{f, P_{n}}^{+}} \\ \left[\lambda_{f, P_{n}}^{-}, \lambda_{f, P_{n}}^{+}\right] & \text{if } \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} < \frac{M}{\lambda_{f, P_{n}}^{+}} \end{cases}$$

where  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^- := \sup\{\lambda : \psi_{f,P_n}(\lambda) = \lambda_{f,P_n}^+ \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}\}$  if the set  $\{\lambda : \psi_{f,P_n}(\lambda) = \lambda_{f,P_n}^+ \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}\}$  is nonempty, otherwise  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^- := 0$ .

Lemma 2. Under the assumptions, for any  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , we have

$$R_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}},1}(P,f) - R_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}},1}(P_n,f) \le \frac{24\mathfrak{C}(\mathcal{F})}{\sqrt{n}} + \frac{12\sqrt{\pi}}{\sqrt{n}}\Lambda_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}} \cdot diam(Z) + M\sqrt{\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{2n}}$$

with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .

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$$\forall h \in \mathcal{H}.$$

 $\mathbb{L}_P[\varphi_{\lambda,f}(z)]\},$ 

#### Adversarial risk bounds

**Theorem 1.** Under the assumptions, for any  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , we have

$$R_P(f,\mathcal{B}) \le \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n f(z_i) + \lambda_{f,P_n}^+ \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} + \frac{24\mathfrak{C}(\mathcal{F})}{\sqrt{n}} + \frac{12\sqrt{\pi}}{\sqrt{n}} \Lambda_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}} \cdot diam(Z) + M\sqrt{\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{2n}}$$

with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .

Apply Theorem 1 to two commonly-used models: SVMs and neural networks.

#### Support vector machines

$$R_P(f, \mathcal{B}) \le \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n f(z_i) + \lambda_{f, P_n}^+ \epsilon_i$$

where  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^+ \le \max_{i} \{ 2y_i w \cdot x_i, ||w||_2 \}.$ 

#### Neural networks

inequality holds

$$R_{P}(f,\mathcal{B}) \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(z_{i}) + \lambda_{f,P_{n}}^{+} \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} + \frac{288}{\gamma \sqrt{n}} \prod_{i=1}^{L} \rho_{i} s_{i} BW \left( \sum_{i=1}^{L} \left( \frac{b_{i}}{s_{i}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right)^{2} + \frac{12\sqrt{\pi}}{\sqrt{n}} \Lambda_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}} \cdot (2B+1) + \sqrt{\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{2n}},$$
where  $\lambda_{f,P_{n}}^{+} \leq \max_{j} \left\{ \frac{2}{\gamma} \prod_{i=1}^{L} \rho_{i} ||A_{i}||_{\sigma}, \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \mathcal{M}(\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{A}}(x_{j}), y_{j}) + \max \mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{A}}(x_{j}) - \min \mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{A}}(x_{j}) \right) \right\}.$ 

$$R_{P}(f,\mathcal{B}) \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(z_{i}) + \lambda_{f,P_{n}}^{+} \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} + \frac{288}{\gamma \sqrt{n}} \prod_{i=1}^{L} \rho_{i} s_{i} BW \left( \sum_{i=1}^{L} \left( \frac{b_{i}}{s_{i}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right)^{2} + \frac{12\sqrt{\pi}}{\sqrt{n}} \Lambda_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}} \cdot (2B+1) + \sqrt{\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{2n}},$$
  
where  $\lambda_{f,P_{n}}^{+} \leq \max_{j} \left\{ \frac{2}{\gamma} \prod_{i=1}^{L} \rho_{i} ||A_{i}||_{\sigma}, \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \mathcal{M}(\mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{A}}(x_{j}), y_{j}) + \max \mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{A}}(x_{j}) - \min \mathcal{H}_{\mathcal{A}}(x_{j}) \right) \right\}.$ 

lowing optimization problem for adversarial robustness.

$$\min_{f \in I}$$

However, since  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^+$  is computationally intractable in practice, instead of using the exact  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^+$  in the objective function, we may consider the data-dependent upper bound for  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^+$  which is usually easier to obtain and a regularization parameter  $\eta \in [0, 1]$  selected via grid search.

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# **EXAMPLE BOUNDS**

**Corollary 1.** In the SVMs setting, for any  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ ,  $\int_{n} \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}} + \frac{144}{\sqrt{n}} \Lambda r \sqrt{d} + \frac{12\sqrt{\pi}}{\sqrt{n}} \Lambda_{\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}} \cdot (2r+1) + (1+\Lambda r) \sqrt{\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{2n}},$ 

**Corollary 2.** In the neural networks setting, for any  $f \in \mathcal{F}$ , with probability of  $1 - \delta$ , the following

# REMARKS

There are two data dependent terms  $1/n \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(z_i)$  and  $\lambda_{f,P_n}^+ \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}$  in our bound, suggesting the fol-

$$\inf_{\mathcal{F}} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(z_i) + \lambda_{f,P_n}^+ \epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}.$$

# REFERENCES